

## PATRONAGE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OF LOCAL LEADER – PEMILUKADA: AN ANALYSIS OF KENDARI'S MAYOR ELECTION IN 2017

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### ABSTRACT

*This paper examines the patronage model found during Kendari's mayor local election in 2017 and the effectiveness of patronage in winning the election. Patronage patterns found in mayoral elections include vote buying, individual gifts, services and activities, the provision of club goods and pork barrel project. The patronage treatment utilizes bureaucratic and entrepreneurial networks by embracing mainstream media, embossing civil society and election organizers. The finding shows that patronage is quite effective in influencing voters in the General Election of Local Leaders. As a result, it was also found that candidates who had the advantage of patronage resources won the election.*

**Keywords:** patronage, general election of local leaders

### INTRODUCTION

Direct local election is a mechanism in determining political leaders at the local level was adopted by Indonesia since 2005. In 2014, the Local Leaders Election (*Pilkada*) regime is almost over, after a tough process by the House of People's Representatives (*DPR*) approves the Law No. 22 of 2014 concerning on the election of government (governor in provinces), bupati (in kabupatens) and mayor (in cities), which is one of its contents restore elections through the Regional House of Representatives (*DPRD*). Luckily, the law was canceled after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (*SBY*) at the end of his term chose not to sign it. This presidential attitude is followed up with the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (*Perppu*) No. 1 of 2015. The substance of the *Perppu* is the return of the local election as General Election of Local Leaders - *Pemilukada* directly by the people, not through the Regional House of Representatives - *DPRD*.

Kendari mayor election in 2017 is the third direct election held after the first and second direct elections in 2007 and 2012, which brought the pair of Asrun and Musaddar Mappasomba as mayor and vice mayor for two periods. The local elections of Kendari City in 2017 were followed by three candidate pairs. The winner of the election is the pair of Adriatma Dwi Putra and Sulkarnain (ADP-SUL), who won 55,769 votes (Regional General Elections Commission - *KPUD* Kendari, 2017). The pair, which was promoted by the political parties; PAN, PBB, PKB, PKS, defeated the candidate pair which was carried by Golkar and Nasdem, Abdul Razak-Haris Andi Surahman, and the pair that was carried by PDIP, PPP, Hanura and Democrat, Muh. Zayat Kaimuddin-Suri Syariah Mahmud. The victory of the candidate pair is indeed supported by a coalition of political parties that controls 51% of legislative seats is quite fantastic because they managed to win in the middle of cynicism and a high negative public perception.

Basically, the public of Kendari does not like this pair for three reasons: firstly, Adriatma Dwi Putra (ADP) is the son of Kendari Mayor - Ir. Asrun, regarded as a form of greed the power of a father who will endanger the continuity of democracy and this must be resisted. On the other hand, civil society action and the testimony of corruption eradication commissions at the national level have campaigned for the dynastic political dangers ahead of the immediate *Pemilukada*, aligning the ADP-SUL pair; secondly, Adriatma is still 28 years old is a candidate who is still very young to be the mayor. By the elders, assume that he is still 'childish' and not worthy of being their leader; and thirdly, the public recognizes him as an arrogant and emotionally unstable figure, illustrated when he was a teenager (high school - SMA) violating the traffic rules and then against the police in charge of giving him a letter of violation.

The above three reasons precisely popularize Adriatma's name, even get low electability. This was shown a month before the election, the results of the release of three survey institutions that he is a candidate for mayor who has the lowest electability.<sup>18</sup> However, public cynicism and low electability are not linear with the results achieved because it is proven that Adriatma (ADP) is the winner. This paper argues that one of the factors of ADP-SUL triumph is due to the distribution of patronage. Therefore, this paper seeks to find the answer that what form of patronage practice in the Kendari mayor election in 2017? and How effective is patronage in winning direct local election?

## THEORETICAL REVIEW

The term patronage is a continuation of the patron-client theory expressed by James C. Scott. According to him (Rauf, 2001) patron-client refers to a two-man relationship (dyadic) consisting of a higher socioeconomic status (patron) using the influence and resources of his or her resources to provide protection and profit to others (Clients) by providing support and assistance, including personal services for patrons. Patron according to Maswadi Rauf (2001) is someone who has a high position and is well-regarded in society and government, is believed to have well-established property and finances so that it affects a large number of people in society.

Scott's theory provides an important contribution in discussing relationships between patrons and clients, not least in discussing the relationship between candidates (politicians) and voters at the election, so that the term patronage occurs. Patronage according to Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) is the provision of cash, goods and services and other economic benefits (a project or project contract) distributed by politicians, including benefits intended for individuals (eg soccer fields for youth in the village). Patronage can also be cash or goods derived from private funds distributed to voters (vote-buying) or from public funds (pork barrel project of the government budget). In short, patronage refers to material or other benefits distributed by politicians to the prospective voters. In patronage, a politician gives goods to prospective voters who have never met before and likely will never meet again.

Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) mentioned five variants of patronage: first, vote buying in the form of cash / goods distributed from the candidates to the prospective voters systematically a few days before the election but accompanied by an implicit expectation that the recipients will respond by voting for the giver; second, individual gifts are goods provided free of charge to voters such as giving calendars or key chains and staple foods of course as a goal to influence voters; third, services and activities are the candidate's efforts by providing or financing various activities and services for voters, such as free health care or sports

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<sup>18</sup>The three institutions that conducted the survey were Indo Baro Meter, Political Science Laboratory of Faculty of Social and Political Science Halu Oleo University (*FISIP UHO*), and Indonesian Survey Research Institute.

tournaments; fourth, club goods are the provision of benefits to voters by targeting certain social groups, such as donating or facilitating religious groups, sports clubs, youth associations, women's associations or farmers / fishermen cooperatives; and fifth, the pork barrel politics project is a government project implemented in a specific geographical area.

## METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach in the form of case study methods. Case studies are needed to track events of contemporary events, especially when relevant events cannot be manipulated (Yin, 2006). The study of patronage and clientelism would be appropriate when approached with a case study as it pertains to the question of how or why. More specifically, this study refers to an instrumental case study as a case study for external reasons, not merely because it wants to know the nature of the case itself but the case to be researched is placed as a means to understand something that is outside the case, such as to prove an existing theory .

The source of the data consists of primary and secondary data. Primary data obtained through interviews and observation results during the election. Secondary data were obtained from reports of research results, printed and online news media. Interviews were conducted with informants aware of patronage and clientelism practices, such as succession team leaders, voice brokers, voters, academics and journalists. Kendari was chosen as the location of this study, for the following reasons: first, the researcher lived in Kendari, in order to facilitate the collection of data by witnessing the event directly; second, the Election Supervisory Board (*Bawaslu*) report states that from seven districts which organized elections in Southeast Sulawesi in 2017, Kendari was ranked top on the money politics report (10 reports). Kendari also occupies the top position in terms of money politics seizure (20 million rupiah); and third, the elected candidate distributed a number of patronages in several variants.

## FINDING SAND DISCUSSION POLITICAL CONSTELLATION IN KENDARI

Kendari is the capital of Southeast Sulawesi province. The autonomous city in 1995 has grown quite rapidly when compared to other districts and cities in Southeast Sulawesi. The city is located on the coast of the bay of Kendari is an attraction for residents from other regions. The migrants and locals compete to fill the work in the formal and informal sectors; there are also those who come to continue their education to the higher level at Halu Oleo University, The State Institute for Islamic Studies - *IAIN* Kendari, or other campuses. The advancement of Kendari City and the backwardness of other districts make this city a destination for vacation and shopping every weekend, which often lead to traffic jams. Some residents who work as civil servants based in Konawe, South Konawe and North Konawe or other areas also choose to settle in Kendari.

The availability of facilities in this city such as airport, shopping center, cinema, hotel and night entertainment become a temporary transit point for invasion of Chinese mining workers from Konawe, Konawe Selatan, North Konawe, Bombana, Kolaka and even Morowali (Central Sulawesi). With a variety of that potentials, majority of the population occupies in the services sector (91,170 people or 74.42%), manufacturing (24,018 people or 9.60%), agriculture (7,312 people or 5.96%). (Source: *BPS*, 2014). This fact shows that the dependence of the population of 347,496 people (in 2015) is very high in the services sector.

On the other hand, migration from other regions forms ethnic diversity. In 2017, Kendari is inhabited by 23 ethnics divided into two groups based on the origin of the indigenous people of Southeast Sulawesi and the population comes from outside Southeast Sulawesi. The indigenous population of Southeast Sulawesi is divided into 4 Tribes, 10 languages, 18

dialeks, 9 sub-dialect including Tolaki, Muna and Buton tribes and languages, while residents from outside Southeast Sulawesi come from Bugis, Makassar, Java, Bali, Toraja, Sunda and Maluku.

Although varied, the observations show that there are only three dominant ethnic groups inhabiting in Kendari namely Bugis, Muna and Tolaki. The survey conducted by the Political Science Laboratory of FISIP University of Halu Oleo shows that Bugis ethnic as the most population in Kendari (23.78%), followed by Muna ethnic (23.24%), Tolaki ethnic (22.16%), Javanese , 29%), Makassar (6.29%), Buton (5.67%) and other ethnic (11.62%)<sup>19</sup>. The dominance of the three ethnic groups is also reflected in the electoral moments, where candidates for mayors, deputy mayors and legislators are dominated by three dominant ethnic groups, Bugis, Muna and Tolaki.

**Table 1. Candidate Pairs of Mayor and Vice Mayor of Kendari in 2007, 2012 & 2017 based on Ethnicity**

No	2007		2012		2017	
	Candidate Pairs	Ethnics	Candidate Pairs	Ethnics	Candidate Pairs	Ethnics
1	Musakir Mustafa-Ridman Abunawas	Bugis-Tolaki	Laode Maghiribi-Rahman Latjinta	Muna-Bugis	Abdul Razak-Haris Andi Surahman	Tolaki-Bugis
2	Asrum Tombili-Anas Nikoyan	Tolaki-Muna	Laode Silverius Unggul	Geo-Oscar	Muna-NTT Adriatma Dwi Putra-Sulkarnain	Tolaki-Bugis
3	Asrun-Musadar Mappasomba	Tolaki-Bugis	Asrun-Musadar Mapasomba	Tolaki-Bugis	M. Zayat Kaimuddin-Suri Syariah M.	Muna-Tolaki
4	Baharudin Aboe Kasim-Yani Kasim Marewa	Tolaki-Bugis	Hasid Pedansa-Orda Silondae	Muna-Tolaki		
5	Jusuf Ponea-Laode Khalifa	Tolaki-Muna	Tony Herbiansyah-Yani Kasim Marewa	Tolaki-Bugis		

Source: Reseacher’s Data 2017

The emergence of ethnic groups in the struggle for executive and legislative positions is inseparable from the strong ethnicity in the city of Kendari (Tirtosudamo, 2006; Suaib, 2005; Jabar, 2009; Zuada, 2013; Syaf, 2014). In the electoral moment, politicians use ethnic groups as a support grip.

**Patronage Practices in General Election of Local Leaders (*Pemilukada*) in Kendari**

At the time of Kendari's mayoral election in 2017, politicians influence voters through patronage practices at the Local Leaders Election stage through vote buying, individual gifts, services and activities, and club goodspork barrel projects.

The vote buying practice in Kendari 2017 mayor selection was done through giving/distributing money to voters ahead of Election Day. Here is the information obtained through interviews with one of the brokers in one of the village in Kendari:

<sup>19</sup>The sample of this survey was taken from 400 respondents spread in 50 out of 64 Kelurahan Kendari. Sampling techniques using multistage random sampling. See Research Publication "Preferensi dan Peta Dukungan Pemilih Menjelang Pemilihan Walikota Kendari Tahun 2017", Survey conducted in December 20, 2016 - January 3, 2017. of Faculty of Social and Political Science Halu Oleo University (*FISIP UHO*)

*One day before the election, the ADP team distributed two hundred thousand rupiahs to each prospective voter. Razak's team also did the same thing but in small amounts, only one hundred thousand rupiah for one voter and sometimes for one household. Thus, voters tend to receive two hundred thousand rupiahs for each, so if in one household consists of 6 voters, then the amount is one million two hundred thousand rupiah.<sup>20</sup>*

Vote buying to prospective voters almost occurred in all villages and sub-district in Kendari. This is done by the succession teams with the amount of 200-250 thousand rupiah per voter. The target of vote buying is only for ADP voters who have been registered by brokers and neighbourhood (RT) leader. Brokers are supervised by government officials at the village (*kelurahan*) and sub-district level. The village chief and chief of sub-district administration, not only as supervisors but as holders of money coming from the central post. The involvement to support ADP by the village chief and chief of sub-district administration and other government officials in Kendari caused by the instructions of the Mayor (ADP's father). These government employees are threatened with sanction of mutation and/or dismissal if they do not support ADP, but on the contrary they will receive promotions if they support. The mayor conducts mutations, dismissals and promotions before and after the elections.

For its purpose of influencing voters, the succession teams not only vote buying but also individual gifts. Distribution of rice, sarongs and envelopes of ADP campaign stickers (filled with money) were carried out by ADP succession teams during a dialogue campaign held in each village<sup>21</sup>. Prospective voters who attended the campaign were distributed rice, sarongs and envelopes. This strategy is quite effective to collect mass in large numbers. Outside of the campaign schedule, the distribution of rice takes place two days before Election Day, as revealed by one voter in Rahandouna Village.

*We got ten kilos of rice from the ADP succession team. This is the second time we receive the distribution of rice. Previously we received in November.<sup>22</sup>*

If the ADP team distributes rice, the Razak-Haris team distributes cooking oil. Although the distribution of individual goods is done more than one candidate, but the voters assess the effects are different. Rice is considered more valuable than cooking oil and its distribution is repetitive, massive and structured. Massive because it is done in almost all *kelurahans*, then structured because in the division involving neighborhoods - RT - leaders and ADP team. The distribution of rice by the ADP team has been well patterned, where the recipients are those who have been given a special sign of stickers in front of their homes. This particular sign is used to identify ADP support households or not ADPs. For households that do not have a special sign will not get a share of rice.

Another pattern that is done in the effort to attract the attention of prospective voters is to conduct free health services, mass circumcision, the distribution of glasses and the provision of materials (sand and cement). This pattern is commonly referred to as services and activities (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). This service is done by candidate Muh.Zayat Kaimuddin-Suri Syariah Mahmud. This candidate uses the time allocation of campaigns to perform Services and activities services using supporting political parties as sponsors<sup>23</sup>, or

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<sup>20</sup>Based on the interview description with LU on 31 March 2017, at 19.00 WITA.

<sup>21</sup> See <http://zonasultra.com/bagi-bagi-beras-sarung-dan-uang-panwas-tegur-adp.html> accessed on 26 February 17 pukul 07.30 WITA

<sup>22</sup>Based on the interview description with NH, 28 April 2017, at 14.35 WITA

<sup>23</sup> See <https://suarahanura.com/2017/01/31/zayat-kaimoeddin-membuktikan-pengobatan-gratis-untuk-warga-kendari/> 30 March 2017

riding on the program of the political party (legislative members)<sup>24</sup> in carrying out their routine social work activities.

In addition, other effort made by candidates in winning the support of voters is to contribute to houses of worship and sports groups. This model is commonly called the provision of club goods. The giving of club goods was done by ADP long before and near the Election Day. This recognition was told by a voter as youth leader in Kambu village.

*Many Razak's supporters are at my place, so there is rarely any money there. The ADP team is great, he can know people who support ADP or not. Perhaps also because he knows if there is not a house of the poor, so money has no impact. So ADP approaches by providing assistance by building badminton field to influence voters. At our housing site, ADP helps the cost of building a badminton field run by youths a week before the election.*<sup>25</sup>

Similar events were also carried out by the ADP in Punggolaka village. While conducting socialization, ADP built communications with mosque officials, and promised that if he was the winner then he would donate sixty million rupiah for each mosque. The same thing was done by the Razak-Haris team.

*Actually I am reluctant to Razak, because he donated one million to our church, but our family has received rice distribution from ADP team.*<sup>26</sup>

In contrast to the Zayat-Suri Syariah team that provides club goods (cement and sand) to areas that are in the process of road repair.

*In this hallway, Derik (Zayat call) prepares sand and cement for the repair of the path, but it is ignored by voters. They prefer cash directly shared by the team.*<sup>27</sup>

In order to influence prospective voters, ADP-SUL allocates government projects in the form of building a residential street (asphalt) and improving drainage as Eka Suaib, et al exposed it in the article in the following quote::

*A resident said that as the election day approached, they did not need the money but they needed a paved path to their housing. The citizens' wishes were responded directly by the Kendari government three days before the election.*<sup>28</sup>

At a glance, these development projects appear to be planned, but in practice they are very concerned about particular target voting areas. In the course of project work was adjusted to the near future election day, between seven to two days before the election, so this project gives a positive image effect for Asrun and ADP. On the other hand, the project provides direct economic benefits to employers (contractors) and laborers (construction laborers).

The economic relations established between the ruler (Asrun), the employers (contractors) and the laborers (construction laborers) changed into political economy relations. During *Pemilukada*, the existence of the contractor gave two benefits to Asrun. On one hand, the contractor provides financial support through donations and distribution of fees<sup>29</sup> to the city

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<sup>24</sup> See <http://zonasultra.com/bersama-umar-arsal-pasangan-zayat-syahriah-adakan-bhakti-kesehatan-gratis.html> accessed on 30 March 2017

<sup>25</sup> Based on the interview description with AR, 8 April 2017

<sup>26</sup> Based on the interview description with NH, 28 April 2017

<sup>27</sup> Interview with K, Kemaraya, on 27 March 2017

<sup>28</sup> See Eka Suaib, et al. 'Filipinization' Politik di Indonesia: Pembentukan Keluarga Politik di Sulawesi Tenggara. A Jurnal Draft, 2017.

<sup>29</sup> The granting of fees to the rulers has become the story of contractors when it comes to getting government projects. The contractors recalled that in this era their rivals are increasingly coming from succession teams and ruling families who became impromptu contractors. Based on interview with one of the contractors in Kendari.

government. On the other hand, contractor support is able to increase direct electoral support by utilizing paid workers. For contractors who do not support ADP is threatened by not renewing their employment contracts<sup>30</sup>. On the contrary for loyal contractors, will get additional new projects. While for workers who do not support ADP get the threat of job loss.

*Right now, each of us has a skipper... during project work, many of my friends are employed as construction workers and porters. In this election, their boss supports ADP so they must also choose ADP in order to keep their plates not broken (defend livelihood).*<sup>31</sup>

**Table 2. Patronage Practices in Selection of Kendari Mayor in 2017**

Candidate Pairs	Vote buying	Individual Gifts	Services and Activity	Public Goods	Pork Barrel Project
ABDUL RAZAK-HARIS ANDI SURAHMAN	50,000-100,000 rupiah (before voting)	Cooking oil	-	Donation of houses of worship (mosque/church)	-
ADRIATMA DWI PUTRA-SULKARNAIN	200,000-250,000 rupiah (during campaign, before and after voting)	Rice, Sarong, envelope containing money (during campaign and before voting)	-	Donations of houses of worship and sports club	Asphalt and paving
MUH. ZAYAT-SURI SYARIAH	-	Glasses to the elderly	Free health care and mass circumcision	Supply of materials (sand and cement)	-

Source: Reseacher's Data 2017

The above description and table illustrates that the pattern of patronage in Kendari mayoral election in 2017 is very diverse. It also appears that all candidate pairs are fighting for patronage to win the election. The difference between these candidate pairs is the superiority of the strategy, the team and the number of patronage they have. In the 2017 election, the advantage is owned by Adriatma Dwi Putra, the son of Kendari Mayor's family, Asrun.

### The Effectiveness of Patronage in Mayoral Elections

Selection of Kendari mayor 2017, shows the strong influence of patronage in winning one of the candidate pairs. The ADP utilizes the power resources controlled by his father (Mayor of Kendari) who perform various patronage practices. The bureaucratic network is used by Asrun to win his son. In order to maintain loyalty and move his subordinates (government officials / bureaucrats), Asrun uses tricks in the form of threats and promotion positions. For those who are not loyal and treacherous to get sanction like mutation and non job, on the contrary those who are loyal will get promotion of position.

The village chief (*lurah*) and chief of sub-district administration (*camat*) instructed by Asrun to control the neighborhood leaders - *RTs* - to win the ADP. For neighbourhood leaders who disobey and do not support ADP get sanction of dismissal or dismissal by the village

<sup>30</sup> Based on interview with L.M. Bariun on 21 January 2017.

<sup>31</sup> Based on interview with S, a construction laborer. 27 March 2017, at 19.30 WITA

chief<sup>32</sup>. Bureaucratic politicization in Kendari 2017 mayor election is also told by Eka Suaib, et al.

*...before the Pemilukada, ...various maneuvers conducted by Asrun in the form of officers change for echelon II, III and IV. For example, Asrun decided to replace the Head of the Department of Population and Civil Registry so that the Ministry of Home Affairs to terminate the server network for the manufacture of electronic ID card. This information extends that the change of officials is because they are less solid to win the ADP.*<sup>33</sup>

The Mayor conducts mutations, dismissals and promotions before and after the elections. The mutation of officials by the Mayor of Kendari was not only done before the election, but also after elections. Official bureaucrats, who are impartial to the ADP and play on two legs, will get non-job sanctions<sup>34</sup>. In the meantime, officials who risked their positions in winning the ADP must be retained or promoted to higher positions<sup>35</sup>. The movement of employees after Pilkada Kendari was complained by the demonstrators and Governor of Southeast Sulawesi, Nur Alam.<sup>36</sup> But the mayor ignored it.

Political sanctions are not only applied to city government civil servants but also to honorary employees. They were identified not to support ADP during the mayoral election, so his/her status as an honorary employee was not renewed.

*There were twenty-two officers of the City Police officers who did not renew their decree because they were suspected of not supporting ADP, even though they were already registered as candidates for civil servants in K2 (second category). Then luckily my neighbor did not get the threat. Yet at the time of the election campaign, he had wanted to participate in campaigning for other candidates but I suggested that he did not need to join the campaign that he finally followed my advice.*<sup>37</sup>

Election organizers such as *KPUD* and *Panwaslu* as independent institutions were targeted to be influenced by the ADP camp. In *KPUD*, Asrun placed his brother-in-law as secretary, while the secretary of *Panwaslu* was occupied by his relative's wife. In *Pemilukada* the position of *KPUD* and *Panwaslu* secretaries is very strategic, considering that they play a lot in the selection and recruitment of ad hoc election organizers, ranging from sub-district, village to polling station - *TPS*. The involvement of the ADP team as an ad hoc election organizer was presented in Eka Suaib, et.al. when interviewing the PPS officer who was also one of the ADP succession teams.

*On the eve of Election Day, the village chief - lurah officials and I bring 100 million to be distributed to voters who are already on our list as ADP voters and we make sure they have the right to vote. We also identify the non-ADP voters, so we do not have to share money with them. The money that has been split is still 50 million and then returned to the treasurer of the winning center.*<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See <http://bkk.fajar.co.id/2017/01/17/dipecat-sebagai-ketua-rt-nurjannah-yakin-karena-politik/>

<sup>33</sup> See Eka Suaib, et al. 'Filipinization' Politik di Indonesia: Pembentukan Keluarga Politik di Sulawesi Tenggara. A Jurnal Draft, 2017.

<sup>34</sup> See <http://inilahsultra.com/2017/03/10/wali-kota-kendari-lakukan-mutasi-besar-besaran/>

<sup>35</sup> The promoted officials include the lurahs who were appointed as sub-district heads. These lurahs are risking their position. Some have been arrested by residents and election observers on suspicion of distributing money and ADP stickers. However, by *Panwas*, they were released because of insufficient evidence.

<sup>36</sup> See <https://tegas.co/berita-utama/mutasi-di-pemkot-kendari-terus-menuai-sorotan/>

<sup>37</sup> Interview with LU, 31 March 2017, at 19.00 WITA.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with an election administration officer at the polling station level who was covertly as ADP succession team, February 16, 2017.



In the selection of ad hoc election organizers, ADP entrusted its winning team as a selection organizer even among those participating in the selection process, so that the composition of the ad hoc election organizers was controlled by them. This winning team is manipulated (not listed as a succession team) as not their winning team to escape as an ad hoc election organizer. Although secretly they are very intense in meeting with village chief and chief of sub-district administration as the fellow team to win the ADP-SUL.

Asrun's political power and financial resources were able to silence and embrace institutions of democracy, civil society and the press. Civil society that became the foundation in strengthening democracy is under the influence of Asrun's power. An NGO *Sultra Demo* as the only Independent Election Monitoring Agency registered and acknowledged by the KPU was successfully influenced. In this institution, the ADP team entrusted their succession teams as volunteer monitors. In *Sultra Demo*, these ADP winning teams are registered by the lurah as volunteers for Independent Election observers.

The involvement of bureaucrats, election organizers, and independent election monitoring institutions in winning the mayor's son was told by one of the brokers who involved in meetings at the mayor's office.

*Many people say that Razak and Derik are favorite candidates, ADP is not counted. As an ADP team, I often do meetings at home office remain unsure of the views of the community. Because the ADP team is at all levels and everything is set up from the provision and distribution of money to the involvement of the organizers at the polling station level. The ADP has involved heads of departments, heads of fields, heads of sections, election committees, village heads and principals. Although, at the meeting there were members of the team who suspected election monitors in a TPS because they did not favor the ADP. However, a Panwas party stated that all was safe (conditioned). I as one of the ADP team recruited by the lurah, was also included as a monitoring team in Sultra Demo. At that time the lurah asked me to submit a copy of ID and photo. I had time to ask what this is for? The lurah advised to be collected. Apparently, I was included in the monitoring team for Sultra Demo. In this Sultra Demo there is Mr. (...), his wife is secretary of Panwas. In the evening (before the election) we gathered at the Citra Land – an elite residential area - where the offices of Sultra Demo, we were given a winning team t-shirt and two hundred thousand rupiah as honorarium. Here, I am more and more convinced that ADP will win the mayor's election because everything is set up.<sup>39</sup>*

The explanation of this informant is accordance with the findings of researchers in the field, mainly related to the leadership and location of the office of NGO *Sultra Demo*<sup>40</sup>. The leader of this NGO still has a family relationship with officials Panwas Kendari - his wife is a secretary of *Panwas* Kendari. In the Mayor election, *Sultra Demo* is the only election monitoring institution registered in KPU Kendari<sup>41</sup>. In addition, this NGO also involved as news coverage, the evidence can be seen on the news posted on the website.

Asrun also affect the news media. The mainstream newspaper in Southeast Sulawesi is governed by an MOU with the government under Asrun's leadership. One of the contents in the MOU is that all winning teams are obliged to become subscribers (consumers) of that daily newspaper, besides, renting a full page. This government cooperation contract provides

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<sup>39</sup> Based on interview on LU, one of the ADP teams, election observers at the polling station level, on March 31, 2017

<sup>40</sup> See <http://www.sultrademo.com/hubungi-kami/>

<sup>41</sup> See <http://bkk.fajar.co.id/2016/08/15/sultra-demo-resmi-terima-piagam-akreditasi-pemantau-pemilu-untuk-pantau-pilwali-kendari-2017/>

economic benefits for the mainstream media. The media provided massive coverage of ADP-SUL campaign promises and political activities. At the time of the General Election, this media also compiled an unbalanced report, tended to be impartial and subjective. The mass media coverage and alignment of ADP-SUL led to the labeling of this media as 'the media of Asrun'.

An academic and media observer, Jufri Rahim, thinks that the role of media in Pilwali Kendari is very strategic. The media may act as partisan media for one of the candidate pairs.

*I do not monitor the electronic media, I just monitor the print and online media. My observation, the average of the candidate pairs using the media, for example one of the papers has a very high subjectivity and blatantly on a particular candidate. I took one example, a media carrying out a row of marching activities wearing a uniform shirt of one of the candidate pairs, this is just an activity, we have not discussed the content of the news. That is for the print media, what about online media as a new media, there are online media that still maintain neutrality and there is also a new media appear or launching only to support certain candidates, called partisan media. Many online media like that ... we can see also the background of his journalists, if the pure journalists release the news, of course he will pay attention to the ethics of his journalist.<sup>42</sup>*

Furthermore, according to Jufri Rahim, media dependence on the government is very high.

*In Southeast Sulawesi, the media are very much dependent on the government, for example, in the advertisement loading, there are certain local governments that fill the main page of a newspaper. Local governments are very happy to be covered as a compliment, for example in the inauguration activities (ribbon cutting), it will be a single page headline. It is destructive to the media image, but this media has been paid, so for me, this kind of media will not last long. Well, that's the official advertising, there are also unofficial ones. I hear if any leader of a newspaper given a project from the government such as journalists who are not professional, but placed as a news correspondent in a government agency. They are then very close to the officials so that the news also praised the government, it could be some of these journalists have officially become civil servants. We also know if the media revenue comes from government agencies that subscribe to the newspaper. However, media revenue is actually more from advertising, not from the selling of newspapers.<sup>43</sup>*

Based on these interviews, it can be concluded that media dependence on the government due to several factors: the first - production costs (newspapers) are so expensive that they are more concerned with advertising for media income; and the second - the existence of unscrupulous journalists who pursue money. This situation makes the media easily controlled by prospective heads of regions that have the power of financial resources. As a result, the media does not provide objective and balanced news. For the government which provides many economic benefits to the media gets preferential treatment in the news. Thus, it is difficult to find critical news to the authorities, lucky there are still some online media as a counterweight to the political business relationship of corrupt media.

## CONCLUSION

Kendari's Mayor Election in 2017 shows the patronage practice through the strategy of politicians in gaining voter support to win the election. All pairs of candidates practice patronage with different variants. Candidate pair, Abdul Razak-Haris Andi Surahman used a

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<sup>42</sup> Based on interview with Jufri Rahim, 8 May 2017

<sup>43</sup> Based on interview with Jufri Rahim, 8 May 2017

vote buying strategy, personal giving and group giving. While Adriatma Dwi Putra and Sulkarnain use four variant of patronage that is vote buying, personal giving, giving group, and pork barrel project. Furthermore, Zayat-Shariah uses personal gifts, group giving and services and activities. Then, candidate pairs using multiple patronage variants have won or outperformed candidates who use little patronage. This shows, the number of patronage is the very decisive victory of candidate pairs in the implementation of direct elections.

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