

## The Effect of Vote Buying on Voters' Behaviour: A Study On 2014 Legislative Member Election Kendari City and Regional Head Election in South Konawe

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### ABSTRACT

*To date, several studies have investigated money politics. For example, it was revealed in Thailand's 1996 general election that one in three households received an average of \$ 27 (Dekel & Wolisnkiy, 2008). Gonzalez et.al (2012) reported that 24% of registered voters admitted receiving souvenirs in Nicaragua's 2008 general election. A candidate in Taiwan had to spend up to \$ 3 million (Grossman and Helpman, E, 1996). In Indonesia, money politics has attracted many researchers' attention, with different focus. Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2009) discusses the theme of party's cartelization, with an emphasis on the distribution of material resources. Ambardi, as with Mietzner (2007), also focused on the issue of fundraising organized by political party. Other studies concerning money politics were carried out by Tomsa (2008), Robison and Hadiz (2004; 2013), Winters (2011; 2013), Aspinall and Sukmajaati (2015). The current study was conducted on the arena of regional elections and the election of legislative members. The research method employed was the quantitative techniques. The population was 470.737, of which 300 was taken as sample. Data were analyzed by using the quantitative analysis. Results showed a significant relationship between vote buying and voters' behavior. Based on the results of multiple regression analysis, the value of Fcount is 77.314, which is higher than the Ftable of 2.65, with a significance level of 0.000. Compared to the significance level of  $\alpha = 0.05$ , the probability value is lower than  $\alpha = 0.05$ . Thereby, the hypothesis proposed in this study was accepted. The implications of this research is that it is necessary to conduct a research on how successful the candidate was in granting rewards to his supporters. Another worth pursuing theme is electoral mobilization strategies adopted by candidates to wider political phenomena, such as policy making, economic redistribution, and the quality of governance.*

**Keywords:** vote buying, patronage, clientelistic, legislative election, regional head election

### INTRODUCTION

The study of money politics (vote buying) has long been a concern of scientists. In the 1996 election in Thailand, one in three households received an average of \$ 27 (Dekel & Wolisnkiy, 2008). Gonzalez et.al (2012) reported that 24% of registered voters admitted receiving souvenirs in the 2008 election in Nicaragua. A candidate in Taiwan had to spend up to \$ 3 million (Grossman and Helpman, E, 1996). In Indonesia, studies on money politics have attracted many scientists, although they have different emphasis (Aspinall 2014a and 2014b). Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2009) discussed the theme of cartelization parties, with an emphasis on the distribution of material resources. Ambardi, as Mietzner (2007) focused on the issue of fundraising by political parties. Studies about money politics have been

conducted by Tomsa (2008), Clark and Palmer (2008), Fauzan, (2009), Robison and Hadiz (2004; 2013), Winters (2011; 2013), Fionna (2014), Aspinall and Sukmajaati (2015).

Given the abovementioned studies, it can be claimed that the practices of money politics have indeed happened. In the era of Suharto, money politics is known as 'dawn raids', which is defined as any attempt to bribe voters in the early hour soon polling day to vote for a certain party. Since the fall of Suharto New Order regime in 1998, there has been a contradictory tendency. On the one hand, there is tendency that voters want the money, goods and services offered by candidates. At the same time, it is realized that the vote buying causes high cost of politics and there is no way of telling what the voters' actual choice.

In 2014 election, vote buying was considered to be massive, vulgar, and brutal (Kompas, April 21, 2014). The candidates strove to influence voters by offering money. In addition to the legislative elections, money politics are also practiced in regional elections. According to Hamirudin Udu (Chairman of Southeast Sulawesi's Bawaslu), as the Election Day was approaching many candidates held a meeting with their followers, during which time envelopes containing money were distributed to all who are in presence (Suara Kendari, August 29, 2015).

In explaining the phenomenon of vote buying, the writer will use the results of a research that was conducted in Kendari and South Konawe. What is discussed here is actually only a small fraction of numerous studies on vote buying in Indonesia. The discussion will be concluded by generalizing the study results on the strategies employed by candidates to approach prospective voters with money and its effect on voters' voting behavior. The contribution of this research is that it attempts to emphasize that vote buying often emerge late very election and it focuses on how vote buying affects voters' voting behavior.

## **RESEARCH QUESTION**

Does vote buying in the forms of giving out money/gifts/goods, programmatic politics, and club good shave any significant impact on voters' behaviour either partially or simultaneously?

## **RESEARCH OBJECTIVE**

The study aimed at determining: (1) the effect of money politics in the forms of giving out personal items (X1), programmatic politics (X2), and club goods (X3) partially on voters' behavior; (2) the effect of personal items (X1), programmatic politics (X2), and club goods (X3) simultaneously on voters' behavior.

## **RESEARCH CONCEPT**

Money politics is the Indonesian term for vote buying (Aspinall, 2014b). At the beginning of the reformation era, vote buying referred exclusively to the practices of bribery in the legislature, when regional heads were chosen by Parliament. The same term is also used to explain the vote buying in congress held by political parties. Even more, the term vote buying is part of political corruption in a more common sense, such as the involvement of members of the legislature in corruption. Lately, the term vote buying is used in a narrower sense, referring only to the giving out of money (in cash and sometimes in goods) by candidates to voters at election time.

The concept of vote buying is proposed by Etzioni-Halevy (in Heidenheimer et al., 1989), who defines it as the exchange of private goods for political support. Fox (1994) suggested that vote buying was "exchanging political rights for material gains". Brusco & Nazareno (2004)

stated that vote buying is a gift of money or general consumer goods by candidates or political parties to voters, as a form of vote exchange. Voters usually feel that they are obliged to vote for a particular candidate or party who has granted them with something.

The concept of vote buying is part of clientelism and patronage (Stokes, 2007). Patronage is the share of benefits among politicians to distribute something individually to voters, campaign workers or activists, in order to gain their political support (Shefter, in Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). Since vote buying is part of patronage, its scope has also been increasingly widespread, as apart from goods, the exchange can also involve cash or social services (Callahan and Mc.Cargo, 1996; Pfeifer, 2004; Schaffer, 2007; Schaffer and Schedler, 2007).

The general forms of vote buying are, firstly, direct exchange between money, goods or services and vote in the election. Secondly, *club goods* is a compensation in the form of material that is not given to individual voters, but to a group, community, or the likes. Thirdly, the *pork barrel* is a gift in the form of projects to areas/regions where the patron is to be voted in. Fourthly, *programmatic goods* is the strategy involving the utilization of state-owned resources in which political calculations, costs, or service are obtained in a programmatic manner, usually in the forms of a product/program and policies for poverty alleviation, healthcare services, well-being for elderly citizens, etc. (Aspinall 2013).

Meanwhile, Stokes (2009) perceives the concept of vote buying in relation to electoral strategies. In general there are two kinds of electoral strategies, *symbolic appeals/non-material appeals* (such as ethnicity, religion, regional, etc.) and *material resources*. Stokes further divides material resources into *programmatic strategies* and *non-programmatic strategies*. Programmatic strategies are usually in the form of programs that serve as compensation to communities through policies; hence they are identical to the terms *piggybacking* program of government policies, such as policies on the poor, the elderly, unemployment insurance, and others. As for the non-programmatic strategies, they are usually manifested in *distributive politics (pork-barrel)* and *clientelism (manipulation of public policies, vote buying, patronage)*.

From the concepts that have been stated above, it is clear that at least one thing is important in vote buying, i.e. the number of material beneficiaries, ranging from individual (one person) to a large and wide community. This of course will be of great help for the researchers in identifying the nature, form, and pattern (mode) of vote buying.

The concept of voters' behavior has so far been explained by three approaches, namely sociological approach, psychological approach, and rational approach. The sociological approach purports that a person's political behavior towards a particular political party is influenced by environmental factors such as social and economic condition, ethnic affiliation, family tradition, membership to a particular organization, gender, occupation, place of residence, and so forth. The psychological approach uses and develops psychological concepts, particularly attitudes and socialization, to explain voters' behavior. This approach is built on the assumption that a political choice is largely determined by the influence of psychological strength growing in a person as a result of a socialization process. The rational approach is also known as the School of Economics, which relies on the rationality of voters in election. In using their rights to vote, voters make their choice according to rational mind and the main reason is usually related to economic matters: whether or not their vote will economically benefit them. In other words, they will vote only if they think they will gain economic benefits from doing so.

Based on the concept of vote buying and voters' behavior discussed above, the effect of one on the other can be investigated. Vote buying can be realized in the forms of giving out goods/gifts/money, political programs, and club goods. Voters' behavior encompasses the

sociological, psychological, and rational approaches to voting behavior. In the sociological approach to voters' behavior, according to Gaffar Affan (1992), other important factor is grouping factor (based on either occupational, religious, or other social factors) which may also crucially determine the sociological approach to voting. This seems to correspond with the model of vote buying in the form of club goods, which according to Edward Aspinall (2013) is the provision of compensation in the form of material not to individual voters, but to a group, community, or the likes (usually a group based on religion, occupation, etc. etc.), so that the number of material beneficiaries are communal yet limited to a certain group level. Therefore, there is a tendency that if people vote due to this aspect of club goods, then a sociological approach is attributable to the constituents' behavior, although we all know that overlaps may possibly occur amongst the different approaches to voting behavior.

As for the rational voting behavior, a rational logic factor is involved, which according to Asfar (2006) would cause voters to act rationally by voting to a party that they perceive to bring maximum profits and reduce losses (of the voters or people). It does then correspond with the patronage model in the form of money and gifts/goods provision, which gives incentives for economic benefits to individuals (Schaffer, 2007). The reason is because it is usually manifested in the form of *fresh money or goods*. Therefore, there is a tendency that if voters opt for this form, the approach taken by the constituents is the rational one, although we all know different approaches to voting behavior can also overlap to some extent.


As far as the psychological approach to voting behavior is concerned, three aspects can exert a most significant effect to voting behavior, including emotional attachment to a political party, orientation towards current issues, and orientation towards the candidate (Asfar 2006). In relation to this, according to Affan Gaffar (1992), is a psychological approach, which is a response to the lack of sociological approach, believing that a person's attitude and political orientation is a result of socialization and re-socialization process via some media or agents such as parents, playmates, siblings, mass media, political organizations, and others.

The socialization process facilitated by these agents/media eventually results in a final product in the form of one's sense of belonging to party (*party-id*) or a particular candidate based on the issues that develop. Therefore, it is in complete conformity with other forms of vote buying that exploits current issues, i.e. the programmatic politics, in that these two forms are frequently associated with a program and its socialization (usually a government program) that is based on current issues in the society. Therefore, there is a tendency that if voters go for the *pork barrel politics* and *programmatic politics*, then a psychological approach is being applied to the voting behavior of the constituents, although we all know this particular approach to voting behavior can also overlap with the other two approaches.

Based on the description above, it is clear that the different perspectives of vote buying can be used to analyze voters' behaviors in an election. In other words, voters' voting behavior is greatly influenced by vote buying.

## **THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

This study involves two variables, independent and dependent variables. The independent variables are vote buying (X), which comprises giving out money/goods/gifts (X1), political programming (X2), and club goods (X3), as well as voters' behavior (Y) consisting of the rational, psychological, and sociological approaches. The diagram of the research can be seen in the following chart:



## HYPOTHESES

Ha: It is hypothesized that vote buying, which consists of the provision of money/gifts/goods, programmatic politics, and club goods, has a significant impact on voters' behavior, either as individual or collective variables.

Ho: It is hypothesized that vote buying, which consists of the provision of money/gifts/goods, programmatic politics, and goods, has no significant impact on voter's behavior, either as individual or collective variables.

## RESEARCH METHOD

The study design is used as a tool for these researchers to determine the influence of vote buying variables on the voting behavior of voters in the 2014 legislative elections and the 2015 election of regional heads. The effect characteristics are tested by means of hypothesis testing. The research was conducted by employing a quantitative method and data were collected by using a survey questionnaire. The data were then processed to test the proposed hypotheses by using the SPSS version 7.00 software. To complement the quantitative results, a qualitative analysis was performed.

Two areas in Southeast Sulawesi province were selected purposively as the research settings, for two considerations. The first consideration is the monitoring report provided by the PUSPAHAM of Southeast Sulawesi, Bawaslu of Southeast Sulawesi, and GAKUMDU regarding the use of money politics during the legislative elections in 2014. According to the reports by these two institutions, the highest use of money politics in legislative elections occurred in Kendari, North Buton, North Konawe, Bombana, Konawe, and South Konawe regencies. On the basis of these reports, the region of Kendari was selected as the study site since the region gained the highest rank of money politics. The second consideration is the type of election to be conducted. On the basis of the second consideration, South Konawe regency was selected. It was then decided that the two regencies under investigation were Kendari and South Konawe.

In this study, the main focus of election product was the 2014 legislative elections and the 2015 election of regional heads. Both types of elections are parts of the processes in Indonesian political activities, which became the focus of this study. They involve a complex process and continue to be refined as part of effort to manifest a good democracy. Prospective members of the legislative who were contesting in the 2014 elections could not be separated from the nomination carried out by political parties through a strict selection in the internal of the parties. With a design of multiparty and open system in determining a candidate, the competition to win the election was very tough. The same condition may happen in South Konawe's local elections in the upcoming December of 2015. The candidates of regional head, which will be decided through a direct election mechanism, must strive to gain support and votes. To influence voters, candidates may employ diverse methods, including but not

limited to granting money/gifts/souvenirs, improving roads, constructing worship places, promising health and educational services and increased wages/salaries, all are offered to convince voters. These various forms of approach can influence voters' belief and attitudes towards each candidate, who makes every effort to secure votes and win the election.

The population of the study was the voters who were registered in the DPT (or shortlisted voters) of 2014 legislative elections in the city of Kendari and those who are registered for South Konawe regional head elections in 2015. The number of DPT in the legislative elections of Kendari was 251.458, and the number of DPS in the election of South Konawe regional head was 219.279 voters.

The total number of samples was 300 voters, half of which were selected from each city (Kendari and South Konawe). Thus, 150 voters were those who have voted in the 2014 legislative elections in Kendari. The same number of voters in South Konawe is those who are going to vote in the 2015 regional head election.

This study employed the *nonprobability sampling* method; given the samples in the population do not have the equal opportunity to be selected. Based on Saunders et al. (2003), this method is applicable in several different techniques. This research used a combination of *purposive sampling* and *self-selection sampling*. In terms of *purposive sampling*, a researcher can decide who will be included in the population, allowing the researcher to select a variety of people existing in the population and to compare any differences and similarities. With respect to *self-selection sampling*, a researcher can simply pick samples out of a population that show response and have the possibility to participate (Saunders et al. (2003). The technique of *non-probability sampling* was chosen in order to obtain respondents that are in accordance with the focus of this research, i.e. voters who have exercised their right to vote in 2014 legislative election in Kendari and those who will exercise their voting rights in the 2015 election of regional head of Konawe Selatan. To come up with a population that can provide a response and has the possibility to participate, the researchers ensured that the respondents have participated in the 2014 legislative elections and the voters will exercise their voting rights on the election of regional head of South Konawe in December 2015, before administering a questionnaire to them.

The variables, dimensions, and indicators can be seen in the table:

No	VARIABLE	DIMENSION	INDICATOR
1	VOTE BUYING	Giving out Money, Gifts, Goods (X1)	Giving out cash money
			Giving out hand phone voucher
			Giving out praying clothes (cap, veil, <i>mukena</i> , etc.)
			Giving out foods, such rice, instant noodles, salt, etc.
			Giving out free t-shirts, uniforms
		Programmatic Politics (X2)	Giving out sugar, milk
			Activities to improve roads
			Activities to mend drainage
			Activities to improve places of worship
			Activities to repair schools, offices, houses, latrines

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			Tax-free to particular group
		Club Goods (X3)	Giving out free t-shirts to particular group Giving out fertilizers to particular group Giving out work tools to particular group
			Religious similarity Regional similarity
		Sociological	Gender similarity Age similarity Ethnic similarity
2	VOTERS' BEHAVIOUR	Psychological	Supporting the same party Party lovers Interest in particular issues Track record
		Rational Choice	Personal Appearance Program Economic Orientation

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## DATA ANALYSIS

To determine the effect of Vote Buying Voters' Behavior, the analysis tool employed is the multiple linear regression analysis by using the following formula:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \dots + b_nX_n + e_i \quad (\text{Sugiyono, 2006})$$

In this study, the model is formulated in accordance with the object of study, as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + e_i$$

where:

$Y$  = Voters' Behavior

$X_1$  = Giving out Money, Gifts

$X_2$  = Programmatic Politics

$X_3$  = Club Goods

$a$  = Constanta

$b_1, b_2, b_3$ . Coefficient Regression

$e_i$  = Other variables not included in the model, both those that are well identified by a theory which may affect, and measurement errors and uncertain components.

The results of the regression coefficient are then used to test the hypotheses by using the F test (simultaneous test) at a confidence level of 0.95 or significance level of  $\alpha=0.05$  by using the following criteria:

- If  $F_{count} > F_{table}$ , then  $H_a$  is accepted and  $H_o$  is rejected
- If  $F_{count} < F_{table}$ , then  $H_a$  is rejected and  $H_o$  is accepted
- Ttest (partial test), if the significance value of  $t < \alpha = 0.05$  at a confidence level of 95%, then  $H_o$  will be rejected and  $H_a$  is accepted (Gudjarti, 1998). The testing is performed by using the SPSS version 20 software.

## RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The summary of the results of the calculation of linear regression analysis in this study can be seen in the table below:

**Table A Summary of the Results of the Multiple Linear Regression Analysis**

Independent Variables	Coefficient Regression	Tcount	Sig. t	Remark
Giving out Money, Gifts, Goods (X1)	0,663	9,978	0,000	Significant
Programmatic Politics (X2)	0,315	5,465	0,000	Significant
Club Goods (X3)	0,382	5,085	0,000	Significant
R = 0,663		Fcount = 77,314		
R-Square = 0,439		Ftable = 2,65		
SEE = 0,691		Sig. F = 0,000		
Constanta = 17.438		Ttable = 1,645		

Source: Results of processed primary data (2015)

Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis presented on the table above, a model of equation that describes the influence of vote buying, in the forms of giving out money/gifts/goods (X1), programmatic politics (X2), and club goods (X3) on voters' behavior, is as follows:

$$Y = 17,438 + 0,663(X1) + 0,315(X2) + 0,382(X3)$$

Based on the multiple linear regression equation and table above, the following explanations are offered:

- The effect of giving out money/gifts/goods (X<sub>1</sub>) on voter's behavior (Y) is positive, with a regression coefficient of 0.663, which means that each 1 unit increase in X<sub>1</sub> will raise voters' behavior (Y) by 0.663, assuming other variables remain constant.
- The effects of Programmatic Politics (X<sub>2</sub>) on voter's behavior (Y) is also positive, with a regression coefficient of 0.315, which means that each 1 unit increase in X<sub>2</sub> will raise voters' behavior (Y) by 0.315, assuming other variables remain constant.
- Club Goods (X<sub>3</sub>) also showed a positive influence on Voter Behavior (Y), with a regression coefficient of 0.382, which means that each 1 unit increase in X<sub>3</sub> will raise Voters' Behavior (Y) by 0.382, assuming other variables remain constant.
- The value of Multiple R is 0.663, indicating a strong correlation between the independent variables, i.e. Vote Buying consisting of Giving out money/gifts/goods (X1), Programmatic Politics (X2), and Club Goods (X3) and the dependent variable of Voter Behavior (Y).



- The value of the coefficient of determination ( $R^2 = 0.439$ ) means that 43.9% of the variation of the Voters' Behavior variable (Y) is attributable to the independent variables simultaneously, namely Giving out money/gifts/goods (X1), Programmatic Politics (X2), and Club Goods (X3), while the remaining 56.1% is related to other variables beyond the model in this study.

## HYPOTHESES TESTING

### Ftest (Simultant)

A simultaneous F-test is used to determine the effect of those variables of Giving out Money/Gifts /goods(X1), Programmatic Politics (X2), and Club Goods(X3) altogether on Voters' behavior. If  $F_{count} > F_{table}$  or the error level is  $\alpha=0.05$  sig. F, then  $H_1$  is accepted and  $H_0$  is rejected, and vice versa.

Based on the results of the multiple linear regression analysis shown on the table above, it is clear that the value of  $F_{is}$  greater than 77.314, the  $F_{table}$  is 2.65, at the significance level of 0.000 when compared to the significance level  $\alpha=0.05$ , thus the probability is smaller than  $\alpha=0.05$ . Given these results, the hypothesis proposed in this study can be received/proved.

### Ttest (Partial)

Ttest or partial test is performed to determine whether the variables of Giving out Money/gifts /goods(X1), Programmatic Politics (X2), and Club Goods(X3) partially (individually) has any effect on Voter's behavior. If  $T_{count} > T_{table}$ , then  $H_1$  is accepted and  $H_0$  is rejected, and vice versa. Besides, the significant value of  $t$  is compared to the Level of Significant (LOS) value of 0.05, and if the significant value of  $t < \text{value LOS} = 0.05$ , then the hypothesis in this study is accepted.

Based on the results of the calculation of multiple linear regression analysis presented on the table above, it is obvious that:

1. The variable of Giving out Money / Gifts / goods (X1) has a significant impact, as separate variable, on Voters' Behavior (Y). This is indicated by the  $t_{count}$  value of 9.978 that is greater than the value  $t_{table}$  of 1.645. Besides, it is also based on the significant value  $t = 0.000$  which is lower than the value of  $LOS = 0.05$ .
2. The variable of Programmatic Politics (X2) partially has a significant impact on Voters' Behavior (Y), as indicated by the  $t_{count}$  value of 5.465 that is greater than  $t_{table}$  value of 1.645. Besides, it is also based on the significant value  $t = 0.000$  which is lower than the value of  $LOS = 0.05$ .
3. The variable of Club Goods (X4) partially has a significant impact on Voters' Behavior (Y). This is indicated by the  $t_{count}$  value of 5.085 that is greater than the  $t_{table}$  value of 1.645. Besides, it is also based on the significant value of  $t = 0.000$  which is lower than the value of  $LOS = 0.05$ .

## DISCUSSION

The findings of this study revealed that all candidates undertake vote buying. Targeted voters are not only those who are loyal to the candidate's party, but also those who are disloyal. This confirms a theory proposed by Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008). Stokes (2005) considered that, since loyal voters belong to traditional share, the target of vote buying is usually floating voters or

those who have no close relation with the party. Diaz-Cayeros et al (2012) points out that, although without money politics, loyal voters tend to vote their party. In contrast to this view, Nichter (2008) argues that money politics is actually targeting loyal voters in order to increase their participation, although in this case, what happens is not a vote buying, but a turnout buying.

In this study, vote buying refers to the offering of cash/goods from candidates to voters in a systematic way a few days before polling day in hope that the voters will vote for the candidates (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). Giving out in the form of club goods is carried out by candidates who offer goods followed by a promise that they will ensure that the government allocate funds for programs that will be publicly distributed in an open, transparent system, rather than granted only to the candidate's immediate supporters (Stokes, 2013).

Most of the candidates, notably the incumbents, make a lot of promises to voters. At the time of legislative elections, incumbents sought to demonstrate their track record in order to convince voters of their success in delivering governmental programs. Incumbent candidates have a great opportunity to take advantage of state-funded development programs. Such programs can take many forms, including road construction, rehabilitation of houses, drainage, traditional markets, and many more creative forms of government's programs. Similar funds are also found in other countries and known as the constituent development fund (Van Zyl, 2010).

Voters do not seem to be shy about asking for money, goods, and programs from candidates of legislative members and heads of region. It turns out that decentralization has given rise to people's pragmatism in the elections of both legislature in Kendari and head of region in South Konawe. The pragmatism is demonstrated by voting preference that is based on the materials gained from a candidate rather than on the candidate's capabilities. As a result, in the decentralization era only rich candidates have a great chance to become regional heads. The elections are still measured in money. Without money, a candidate will be unlikely to get voted, no matter how high his/her degree of idealism is. Idealism does not seem to appeal to people who take money as their main consideration in electing heads of region.

The principle that those who have money will rule is adopted in the areas of the research. All candidates employed this principle to defeat their political rivals. This is supported by the ownership of large amount of money and capital. All candidates, either at the time of legislative elections or the election of regional heads, get themselves closer to the community by giving out donations. Not only do they contribute to the mosque, but they also diligently conduct door-to-door visits under various pretexts, such as socialization, strengthening relationship, and social visitation. Ironically, all of them are doing the same things so that it paints a wrong image that to become a leader a lot of money is required. Consequently, a mistakenly shaped people's mindset is created: money is more important than vision and programs.

Panwaslu of Kendari city and the district of South Konawe acknowledged that it is difficult to make both the legislative and the local head election in the two cities free from money politics and intimidation. That is because the elections have so far been using the media of campaign/socialization that expend candidates' money and manpower in a large amount. The candidate believes the campaign or socialization as the most effective way to create a positive image of themselves, which they use to reap votes. Voters are looking forward to any advantages they can gain from a candidate in a campaign or socialization. To the voters, money, free t-shirts, gloves, and other items are the main reason for voting a candidate, not the vision or mission of the program proposed by the candidate. Thus, there is a symbiotic mutualism between voters and the candidate. Candidates need people's vote, voters need candidates' money.

Money politics has become rampant in procedural democracy adopted in the era of decentralized due to low welfare and educational level of the people in these two areas. People cannot elect freely if they are still poor. Economic dependence and being economically dependent have given people no chance for choosing freely.

According to Michael Buehler, an institutional change in the form of direct election of regional heads beginning in 2005 in Indonesia has experienced a deviation from its noble goal to restore real power to the people. Direct election of regional heads has forced local elites to work more actively and regularly with voters in order to gain access to, and maintaining, power. However, the implications of direct election are the rising cost required to win the politics, the changing pattern of power accumulation, a rise of political machine, an increase of political corruption, and a growing role of personal networks owned by power brokers (Buehler, 2005).

## CONCLUSION

The results of this study showed that there was a significant relationship between vote buying and voters' behavior. Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis obtained from the results of the study, the value of F count is 77.314, which is higher than the value of F table of 2.65, with a significance level of 0.000. If compared to the significance level of  $\alpha=0.05$ , then the probability is lower than  $\alpha=0.05$ . Thus the hypothesis is proposed in this study is accepted/proved.

Elected candidates were involved in money politics and this was possible because political parties do not work optimally in performing their functions. Candidates' capability to use money in politics is determined by the resources they own. The more diverse and greater the available resources, the greater the potential for the candidates to take advantage of vote buying in the electoral arena. In the patronage tradition, the candidates grant materials and non-materials to voters. In their position as recipients, the voters are obliged to return the grant in the form of electoral support.

The implication of this research is the need to conduct a research on how successful a candidate in giving rewards to his voters. In addition, it is worth to look at electoral mobilization strategies employed by candidates in wider political phenomena, such as policy making, economic redistribution and the quality of governance.

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