

## **A Post Resettlement Appraisal of the Socio-Economic Condition of Gbagi People in Kubwa, Federal Capital Territory (Fct) Abuja, Nigeria**

**Iorliam T. Sylvester**

Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Benue State University,  
Makurdi, NIGERIA.

siorliam@bsum.edu.ng, bwilliamsdesilva@yahoo.com

### **ABSTRACT**

*As many countries strive to move from the backwaters of under development to the commanding heights of economic greatness by executing large scale infrastructural projects, massive displacement and resettlement of people from their ancestral homes has been the bane of society globally. This paper appraises the socio-economic condition of Gbagi people displaced during the development of Phases I and II of the new Federal Capital City Abuja who are now resettled at Kubwa. With the aid of field assistants, data on Four socio-economic variables: education, employment/occupation, income and social welfare/communal relationships were collected through interviews from 450 household respondents purposely selected from the 5 major population clusters in Kubwa town using structured questionnaires. The data was analysed using tables, frequencies and simple percentages. The results shows that the Gbagi people resettled in Kubwa are socio-economically worse off than they were in their original villages: The opportunities for basic education are lost, and there is high unemployment rate and dwindling household incomes occasioned by dislocation from traditional farming occupations. Nevertheless, the people enjoy more social welfare facilities than ever before, though they have significantly lost valuable social support networks through kith and kin social relationships during their stay at Kubwa. It has been recommended that more government schools and skill acquisition centres be established at Kubwa to enhance educational status and engage the towering crowd of unemployment among the people. Also timely implementation of future similar programmes and projects is recommended*

**Keywords:** Development, displacement, resettlement, socio-economic condition

### **INTRODUCTION**

Over the past 25 years, World Bank Environment Department WBED estimates that more than 250 million people worldwide have been displaced as a result development projects. Since the mid -1950s, development as modernization has been the age long view by those engaged in the development of traditional simple third world societies. Like the western countries, they contended that African states must embark on large scale infrastructure development projects to achieve improved societal well-being implicit in economic development (Robinson, 2004). And so 'if people were uprooted along the way of such development projects' as Robinson (op cite ) observed, 'that was deemed a necessary evil or even as actual good since it made them susceptible to change'.

To keep to the ethos of modernization in post independent Africa, the governments of sub-Saharan Africa states embarked on implementation of large scale infrastructure projects so as to accelerate the pace of their socio-economic development to enviable levels akin to the complex westernized nations. Such projects often led to massive eviction of people from their ancestral homelands but were nevertheless justified by the argument that 'the project will

lead to more efficient use of land and thus generate more returns than before for the mainstream of society' (Terminski 2013).

In Nigeria, beginning from the construction of the Kainji dam in 1963 for hydroelectricity and its attendant resettlement scheme, several development projects emerged in the 70s including River Basin Development Projects, creation of military installations, Land Clearing Schemes, large institutional projects and urban renewal programs that induced massive population displacements and resettlement. From the 1980s, however, urban development and redevelopment projects such as provision of staff housing, the development of new administrative capital cities (for newly created states and local governments) and particularly the movement of the Federal capital from Lagos to Abuja emerged as the major drivers of Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement in Nigeria (DIDR).

The development of Nigeria's new Federal Capital Territory (FCT) project at Abuja covering 8000km<sup>2</sup> is the largest and most prominent development project in recent times that stimulated massive population displacement. The decision to relocate the administrative capital of Nigeria from the coastal colonial city of Lagos to more centralized location at Abuja was taken in the mid-70s. And To make the new capital city Abuja 'home for all Nigerians, about 300,000 indigenous inhabitants of 600 villages in Abuja were penciled out for displacement and resettlement in places of their 'choice' outside the FCT (Abumere 1981). However after due consideration, this decision was later considered to be economically unwise and that it would delay the development of the FCT; thus the federal government again decided that the inhabitants be resettled within the FCT. Consequent upon this, several satellite settlements were considered for the resettlement programme, one of these is Kubwa.

In phase 1 of the Abuja Federal Capital City master plan, indigenous populations made up essentially of the Gbagi ethnic group from Garki, Jabi, Maitama and Kukwaba villages were subsequently displaced and resettled at Kubwa by the federal government. The Kubwa resettlement scheme was based on the United Nations philosophy that 'no resettled person should emerge from the resettlement scheme worse off than he was before displacement'. Translated in socio-economic terms this meant that the resettlement scheme apart from ensuring minimum disruption of the existing ways of life and social relations of affected persons (APs), would provide better opportunities for improving educational status, better jobs and improved incomes as well as access to better medical health care services and sanitation in a well laid housing environment (Kalgo & Ayileka eds, 2001).

Although government bureaucracy and political instability in the country at that time delayed earlier implementation of the project, by 1993, majority of the people penciled out for eviction from their original villages for the development of what is now the phase I and II or the 'Central Area' of Abuja city finally moved into Kubwa, a resettlement town built by the federal government. It is over two decades since the resettlement of the Gbagi people in Kubwa took place, and the question arises "what is the socio-economic condition of the Gbagi people resettled in Kubwa?" This paper attempts a synoptic appraisal of the social and economic condition of the resettled people in the Kubwa resettlement centre.


## **STUDY AREA.**

Kubwa is a small town in Bwarri Local area council of Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory Abuja. It is located at the northern fringe of the capital city Abuja and is bounded in the north by Bwari - Aso range of hills, while to the south the area is bounded by the outer northern express way leading to Abuja city. The resettlement area covers an approximate land mass of 860 ha.

The Kubwa scheme was for resettlement of local communities essentially made up of Gbagi ethnic extraction that were displaced by the development of phases I and II of the Federal Capital City. By 1982, when the project was conceived, the entire Gbagi population in the villages to be displaced for resettlement was 2400 (FCDA, 1989). They are predominantly peasant farmers and they live in communities headed by a traditional head. Socio-economic interactions are more on the local market days and Sundays when they are free from farm work. They depend on the cultivation of local food and cash crops for their livelihood.

However in consideration of future growths, the 20 year Kubwa resettlement master plan was prepared to accommodate a total population of 21,000 inhabitants. The displaced persons from the five villages of the now phases I and II of the capital city were eventually resettled according to their village identities in 5 population clusters or residential neighbourhoods in their new home. This principle was to warrant minimal disruption of their socio-economic activities and communal life styles by preserving individual village identities within the overall objective of ensuring that no resettled person emerged worse off than he was after the scheme.

However due to administrative bottle necks and instability in the country, the implementation of the scheme was delayed until the 1990s when the capital of Nigeria was finally moved



from Lagos to Abuja. By this time there was a mad rush for accommodation for staff and business people who were moving from Lagos or who were deployed from other states to the new federal capital city. Because of dearth of accommodation in the capital city, many new migrants moved to nearby satellite settlements in search of individual residential accommodation as well as land for the development of residential estates. And although Kubwa was initially planned for the resettlement of those displaced by the development of Phase I of the capital city plan, companies and individuals invaded the hitherto serene resettlement town with tempting monetary offers for land and already built residential housing. Both rental values and cost of land became so high that many of the resettled persons initially allocated land for agricultural purposes eventually either sold out or out rightly converted to residential purposes. The result of this scramble was a gradual infiltration of the Kubwa resettlement town by the class of elites of higher socio-economic status who engaged in land transaction business with the initial holders. Besides, several government agencies and the organized private sector also moved in to develop residential housing estates and other community facilities like schools, hospitals and recreation centres for the purpose of profit making. Thus today Kubwa has become a heterogeneous society with peoples of diverse ethnic backgrounds and social status.

## **CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR)**

The development of physical infrastructure such as dams, highways, industrial parks and urban development projects require large quantity of land. It also involves the introduction of direct control by the developer over land previously occupied by another group. The local communities are therefore often forcibly removed from their native lands in the name of such development projects. One justification for the implementation of such projects and forcible removal of people from their native lands is the argument that the project will lead to more efficient use of land and thus generate more returns than before for the benefit of society. Although there are no complete statistical data of people uprooted from their homes and communities, Cernea (2006) and Oliver-Smith (2009) have estimated that approximately 10-15 million people each year worldwide are displaced from their original homes and resettled elsewhere due to large scale public infrastructural development projects.

In literature, Terminiski (2012 and 2013), has distinguished between the concepts displacement and resettlement. Displacement according to him is most often used in the context of relocation related to deprivation of access to existing land and resources without adequate support mechanisms for the affected persons. This is mostly applied to the situation of individuals or communities that have been cut off from their current socio- economic base with resultant significant deterioration in their standard of living (Terminiski, 2013). The phenomenon is not only limited to physical departure from the current home land but also it is mainly associated with the loss of existing economic and social facilities and of access to the relevant resources with no benefits gained in return. On the other hand, resettlement according to Terminski (2012), refers to relocation based on previous plans and consultation with the affected persons which is usually accompanied by adequate support mechanisms in the new place of residence. In this case, both the costs of physical detachment from original home and lose of home based resources of sustainability are compensated for by the support received in the new location.

From the foregoing arguments, Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR) can be seen as the relocating of individuals and communities out of their homes, also often out of their home lands/ resources for the purpose of economic development with

support mechanisms to enhance their livelihood in the new locations. The type of development projects causing displacement by 1993 according to World Bank Environment Department (WBED) range across a wide spectrum from dams, canals and irrigation projects (constituting over 60 percent). However in recent decades, other activities such as mining, creation of military installations, industrial plants, urban development/redevelopment processes, and the development of new administrative headquarters or capital cities have often induced population displacement and resettlement.

Although there are no exact available statistics on the geographical distribution of development induced displacements the world over, South-East Asia consisting of China and India according to Fuggle et al (2000) and Jason (2004) have clearly the largest number globally. In that region, most of the displacements are from dam construction projects such as the Three Gorges Dam project in China and the Narmada Sarovar Dam project in India. And much DIDR is involuntary with government authorities, security forces or private militias forcing people from their homes and lands.

In most DIDR, De Wett (2006) noted that the displaced persons are often left socially and institutionally disrupted as much as they may economically also emerge worse off and the environment suffers as a result of the introduction of infrastructure and increased crowding in the area. In Africa, there is much evidence that African governments' resettlement schemes have the targeted project for which people are displaced as their primary concern, while resettling people involved, is of secondary importance (Olawepo 1997 and 2006). Consequently 'the displaced Persons' may face physical and mental stress (Woube, 2005), just as resettlement tears apart the social fabric of existing communities and creates risks of impoverishment and can dismantle indigenous production system and way of existences (Cernea, 1991; Tan & Yao, 2006).

Nevertheless, resettlement also has its positive attributes. For instance the provision of modern houses in 21 resettlements sites at Jebba is one of the positive consequences of forced relocation. Olawepo (2008) observed that about 1374 modern housing units were provided at Kalema, Bukah, Gbajibo, Leaba, Salkawa among other resettlement sites even though most families suffered occupational dislocation and major disruption of domestic economy. Also in the Kainji resettlement scheme, Brightmer (1983) reported that apart from little displacement effects there were positive changes in socio-economic and physical structures, as well as, income and landscape development. Such changes included, the growth of communities, increased population, building of public institutions, improved standard of living, and promotion of inter community relations among others.

On the whole the overall balance sheet of any resettlement scheme could display an array of both positive and negative consequences which has to be weighed against its objectives so as to derive an accurate picture of the level of success achieved or otherwise of the programme. This in most cases is accomplished through an appraisal or evaluation of the overall resettlement scheme against its objectives over time

There are several approaches to resettlement evaluation; however, Churchill M. Fakudze (2000) quoted Hulme (1988) as condensing these into three: conventional evaluations, radical and political approaches and the social consequences approach. According to Fakudze (op cite), conventional evaluations are premised on examination of policy outcomes while they are still in operation (ex-ante evaluation) or after they have ended (ex-post evaluation). This enables decisions taken as a result of an appraisal to be reviewed in the light of what actually happened while taking into account changes in the external environment.

Radical and Political Approaches seek to make evaluations by identifying the position of the schemes in the world economy and examining the general processes operating on settlers and scheme. They attempt not merely to comment on scheme performance but to provide a framework for total understanding. This paper does not deal with these issues.

The Social Consequences Approach is concerned with the impact of schemes on individuals, families and communities. According to Becker (1997), this approach assesses the socio-economic consequences for the affected human populations of any public development project that alters the ways in which people live, work, play, relate to one another organize to meet their needs and generally cope as members of the society. The outcome of this process is the understanding of the social impacts of the project, making conclusions and identifying ways to improve project implementation and its effects. This is the approach of evaluation that is central to our investigation of the socio-economic impact of resettlement on the Gbagi people in Kubwa, Abuja federal capital territory.

## METHODS AND MATERIALS

To carry out our investigation, an initial reconnaissance survey with the guidance of a local field assistant was carried out to identify houses belonging to the original resettled Gbagi people in Kubwa town. From the identified houses the head of each household or the most grown up person was picked for the study. Altogether a sample of 450 respondents consisting of men and women was purposely drawn from the 5 major population clusters or residential districts in Kubwa town. The number of sampled respondents from each cluster was relative to its entire population. The sampled respondents were then interviewed using structured questionnaires. The questionnaire was divided into 2 parts; part A elicited the demographic data of respondents while part B sought topical data on the socio-economic condition of the respondents in the resettlement town. The socio-economic condition of the Gbagi people in Kubwa was investigated along 4 major variables: educational opportunities, employment/occupations stability, income and social welfare/ communal relationships.

The interview was carried out with assistance of trained field assistants. Tables, frequencies and simple percentages were then used to analyse the data for discussion.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Demography Characteristics of Respondents

The demographic characteristics of the sampled respondents have been captured in table 1. According to data in the table, 72 per cent of the respondents were males, while 28 percent were females. Youths constituted 29.8 percent of the respondents. A greater proportion of the respondents were within the ages of 31 and 45 years. While those above 45 years were 28.5 percent of the sampled population.

**Table 1. Demographic data of respondents**

<i>1. Sex</i>	<i>No of respondents</i>	<i>percentage</i>
Male	324	72 %
Female	126	28 %
Total	450	100 %
<i>2. Age</i>		
< 30 years	135	29.8
30 - 45 years	189	41.7
Above 45 years	126	28.5

3. Education		
None	189	42
Primary	165	36.6
Sec. School/ TC	85	18.8
II Cert		
ND/ NCE	34	7.5
University degree and above	11	2.4
4. Marital status		
Married	326	72.4
Single	56	12.4
Divorced	68	15.1

Source field work, 2012.

Furthermore, the educational background of the respondents presented in table 1 shows that majority of them are illiterates without primary school education while those with at least primary school qualification constituted the second largest percentage (36 %). Respondents with secondary school qualification constitute about 18 percent of the sample while those with tertiary and university qualifications together are less than 10 percent of the sampled population.

**Opportunities for Basic Education.**

(i). Availability in terms of proximity to nearest school

Table 2 presents a comparative summary of findings on households’ locational proximity of their homes to nearest primary schools before the resettlement and after they have been resettled in Kubwa resettlement town.

**Table 2. Access to primary schools (km) before resettlement and after resettlement in Kubwa**

Proximity Distances	Before resettlement		After resettlement	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
≤ 1km	38	8.5	142	31.5
1km-2km	59	13.4	128	28.4
≤ 3km	157	35.0	54	12.0
3km-4km	67	14.8	67	14.8
≥ 5km	128	28.1	59	13.1
Total	450	100	450	100

Source: Field work 2012

According to table 2, before moving to Kubwa about 30% of the household respondents lived within 2km distance to primary schools. However, after the resettlement in Kubwa more than 59 % of the respondents now live within 2km distance to nearest primary schools. Also while 35% of the respondents lived about 3km from the nearest primary schools when they were at their original villages, only 12 % had to travel that distance to schools while in Kubwa.

Finally while over 40 % of the respondents admittedly lived beyond 3km from primary schools in their original homes, less than 30 % of the sample population resettled in Kubwa has to travel that distance to school. The above results show that with respect to physical distance, the resettled persons have higher proximity to schools. In other words, there are more schools in Kubwa and hence more opportunities for primary education than they ever had in their ancestral places of origin.

**Affordability of Schools**

In terms of financial affordability, a comparative assessment of who owns the schools available to the sampled Gbagi people in their former places of abode (before resettlement) and in the new homes (after they were resettled in Kubwa) was investigated to ascertain chances of free basic education to the resettled people now and before. The result has been presented in table 3.

**Table 3. Who owns the available primary schools**

<i>School's</i>	<i>Before Resettlement</i>		<i>After Resettlement</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Government	234	52.1	146	32.4
Private	57	12.4	304	67.6
NGO	158	35.50	-	-
Total	450	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Field work 2012

According to table 3, before resettlement government owned schools were within easy access to 52 % of the household respondents while after resettlement only 32 % of the sampled households had easy access to government owned schools. Besides, while 35% of the respondent lived close to schools owned by NGOs (particularly missionaries) in their original home places, none of the respondents indicated access to such schools in the resettlement site at Kubwa (schools owned by missionaries are often grant aided by government and therefore they charge little or no fees at all thus they are relatively more affordable to some households than private schools). On the other hand before their displacement from their villages while barely 12 % of the households indicated that they were restricted to the option of sending their children to privately owned schools, after the resettlement, privately owned schools became the only option available to over 67% of the respondents population in Kubwa. In other words at the resettlement site in Kubwa, the number of schools established by private sector organizations' dominated over the number of schools provided by government for the resettled population. This means the predominantly low income resettled persons in Kubwa had fewer opportunities to acquire affordable or free primary school education than they had in their original abodes.

The implication of findings on availability and affordability of educational institutions to enhancing basic education status of the Gbagi people is that, although there are more primary schools in Kubwa than in the former places, government schools offering free or affordable education are quite fewer or inadequate. Consequently, the chances for acquiring basic education to over 67% of the people is quite lower than what obtained in their former places of abode. Most of the schools in Kubwa or 67% are owned by the private sector and therefore



are profit driven. They normally charge high fees that could easily price out the predominantly low income resettled Gbagi households / families.

### Opportunities to Affordable Secondary Schools in Kubwa

Also in terms of secondary school education, the more government schools are established in a place, the more affordable are the school fees and the higher the residents have better opportunities for affordable secondary school education of their children. On the other hand, the more private secondary schools in a place the less affordable are the fees and the fewer the opportunities for secondary education especially among the low income peasant families.

Data on ownership of secondary schools established in Kubwa are again presented in table 4.

**Table 4. Ownership of available secondary schools**

<i>Ownership</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Government	87	19.4
Private	363	80.6
Total	450	100.00

Source field work 2012

According to findings in table 5, while public secondary institutions are available to 19 percent of the household respondents, over 80 percent of the respondent households indicated that secondary institutions located around their resettled homes in Kubwa are privately owned without any government control.

This means that 19 percent of the sampled population has access to public schools and therefore has high opportunities for secondary education of their children in their resettlement home in Kubwa. As government schools, the fees are moderate and within the reach of most low income households. On the contrary, private secondary institutions predominate in Kubwa and therefore over 80 percent of the sample population has to pay high fees to acquire secondary school education in the resettlement home. The proprietors of private schools have to charge high fees to maximize their profit; this invariably may limit the chances of acquiring secondary school education by the low income households.

From the overall analysis of educational opportunities in Kubwa, it could argued that quite unlike the resettlement schemes goal of improving the educational opportunities of the displaced persons in their new home, government did not provide adequate number of schools that could enhance the educational status of the resettled households. Consequently most of the affected persons seemingly lost the opportunities to education they had in their original places of abode. This is because even though there are more schools in Kubwa town than in their original villages, most of these are owned by the private sector for profit maximization. Therefore the financial disposition of most of the households cannot afford the high fees charged by the private school owners. The resettled Gbagi people are therefore placed at the disadvantage position in because of ill affordability.

### Employment Status/Occupational Stability of the Gbagi People in Kubwa.

The employment status and occupational stability of the Gbagi people in the resettlement site was investigated by comparing the respondents' present employment/ occupations (after resettlement) in Kubwa with the activities of livelihood they engaged in before displacement from their original places of abode. This has been presented in table 5.

**Table 5. Occupational disposition of the respondents before displacement and after their resettlement in Kubwa.**

<i>Economic activity</i>	<i>Before Displacement</i>		<i>After Resettlement</i>		<i>Percentage differentials</i>
	<i>Responses</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Responses</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	
Farming	289	64.2	37	8.3	-55.9
Wage employment	15	3.4	45	10.0	+6.6
Informal services	41	9.1	90	20.0	+10.9
Unemployed	105	23.3	278	61.7	+38.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>450</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>450</i>	<i>100</i>	-

Source: Field work 2012

According to our findings, before the displacement of the Gbagi people from their original places of abode, about 64.2 % of the sampled respondents were farmers, 9 % were engaged in informal activities/ services (such as petty trading, shoe shining, blacksmithing and bicycle / motorcycle repairing) while those engaged in monthly wage employment or ‘monthly salary jobs’ constituted about 3.4 %. On the other hand, the number of the unemployed accounted for 23% of the sample population. On the whole, over 76 percent (76.7%) of sampled respondents had regular means of livelihood while a barely 23 % of the sample was completely without any dependable jobs.

However, after the resettlement at Kubwa, table 5 further shows that the population of those engaged in active farming remarkably dropped to 8.3 %. This means over 55% of the population previously engaged in farming loose out from farming business. Besides, in the Kubwa resettlement home, 20 % of the sample respondent population now engages in informal activity jobs while 10 % have gotten regular wage or salaried employments. This means on the whole the number of Gbagi people engaged in gainful economic occupations has dropped to 39 % while on the contrary, unemployment has regrettably increased to over 61% of the sampled respondent population.

The rather high percentage of the unemployed among the sampled population in Kubwa could have been due to the dramatic dislocation of over 55% of the hitherto farming population from their traditional means of livelihood. With the influx of foreigners in Kubwa as result of sudden movement of federal capital from Lagos to Abuja in the 1990s when there emerged a mad rush for housing accommodation, demand for land by corporate bodies and individual business men was high. This group probably could have compromised their hitherto farm lands to invading estate developers who would offer and pay tempting prices for any piece of land at Kubwa. After such sales, farmlands could have been lost and these category of resettled persons unavoidably thrown out of farming occupations in to the pool of the unemployed with options to engage in informal activity services.

On the whole therefore, there is much disruption of occupations leading to an increasing wave of unemployment among the people after their resettlement at Kubwa.

### **Resettled Persons’ Household Incomes**

The impact of displacement and subsequent resettlement on household income disposition of the sampled respondents is summarized in table 6.

**Table 6. Household incomes of resettled Gbagi people in Kubwa**

<i>i. household incomes after resettlement</i>					
%	Grossly higher	Slightly higher	The same	Slightly lower	Grossly lower
	11.8	22.1	12.7	28.5	24.8
<i>ii. cost of living after resettlement</i>					
%	Far lower	Slightly lower	Same as before	Slightly higher	Far higher
	8.9	17.7	10.2	32.3	30.1
<i>iii. adequacy of household incomes</i>					
%	Grossly adequate	Slightly adequate	Not sure	Slightly inadequate	Grossly inadequate
	7.5	18.7	11.7	30.5	32.5

Source: Field work 2012

From this table, more than 50% of the respondents experienced various drops in their household earnings upon resettlement at Kubwa, while about 30 % attested to earn higher income in the resettlement camp than before with the remainder percentage population showing no significant change in their monthly household earnings. Furthermore, the cost of living according to more than 60 % of the respondents is higher in Kubwa than their place of origin. Only about 15% accepted to have experienced lower living costs in the resettlement home than before, the remaining percentage of the population was indolent over living costs between the two places.

However, from the study, while about 25 percent of the respondents agreed that their household earnings are adequate to cost of livelihood in Kubwa settlement, 60 percent expressed varying levels of their household incomes' inadequacy to cope with the economic realities of livelihood in the Kubwa.

### **Opportunities For Social Welfare Services/Communal Relationships**

In this case respondents compared opportunities to health care services, access to electric supply, pipe borne water and social relationships in Kubwa with their previous experiences in their places of origin. The result of their comparative assessment has been summarized in table 7.

The result of our study presented in table 7 shows that more than 60 % of the sampled household respondents expressed higher access to better medical services than in their previous place of origin while 24% had lower access. Nevertheless, in terms of costs, over 65 % of the respondent felt the cost of medical services are higher at Kubwa than in their original homes. Only about 35% of the sample respondents considered the cost as the same or even lower than medical costs in their places of origin while.

In terms of utility services such as electricity and water supply, over 70% of the sampled population experience higher levels of satisfaction with the services in Kubwa than in their original homes. However 16 % considered it as same while about 13 % experienced lower satisfaction with services than what used to be in their former home places.

**Table8. Comparative assessment of well-being variables at Kubwa**

<i>i. Access to medical clinics/services</i>					
%	Quite higher	Slightly higher	Same	Slightly lower	Quite lower
	29.5	32.5	13.6	14.2	10.7
<i>ii. Cost of medical care services</i>					
%	Quite lower	Slightly lower	Same	Slightly higher	Quite higher
	9.8	11.9	13.5	28.8	40.0
<i>iii. Pipe borne water / Electricity supply</i>					
%	Quite higher	Slightly higher	Same	Slightly lower	Quite lower
	22.5	48.2	16.0	10.0	3.8
<i>iv. Communal relationships/ social interaction with neighbours</i>					
%	Quite higher	Slightly high	Same	Slightly lower	Quite lower
	20.6	10.7	8.2	35.5	25.0

Source: Field work 2012

Finally, communal relationships and general social interaction with neighbours in Kubwa is quite low to over 60 % of the sampled respondents. Only about 30 % of respondents maintain high social relationships with neighbours while the remaining 8% did not notice much difference in the way they interact and relate with neighbors in the new home.

The limited social and communal relationships experienced by the resettled Gbagi people in their new home could be explained. By the delayed implementation of the federal capital development project and sudden movement of the federal capital city from Lagos to Abuja in the 1990s, Kubwa was one of the few villages where people could take refuge for accommodation. Most of the Gbagi people sold out their landed property to the new commers and moved out of the town. Consequently, massive heterogeneous population consisting of people from different tribes from all parts of the country came to co-habit with the local community of resettled Gbagi people in Kubwa. Because this group consisted of the higher social class group and was drawn from different cultures the level of social interaction could be highly low with the remaining local Gbagi resident population.

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

From the fore going analysis, it can be argued that the socio-economic condition of the Gbagi people has been adversely affected as a result of their resettlement in Kubwa. Although there are more schools in Kubwa than there was in their original places of abode, there is dearth of public schools that could offer affordable primary and secondary education to enhance the education status of the resettled Gbagi people in Kubwa, consequently most households' educational status are low. Besides, there is massive disruption of occupation and domestic economy leading to a dramatic rise in unemployment rate among the resettled group. Affected mostly are farmers who compromised their farmlands and ended up in the unemployment pool. Again the loss of farm jobs coupled with higher cost of living in the heterogeneous urban community at Kubwa has more or less decimated the household incomes of the resettled persons than ever before. Finally even though there is improved

social welfare facilities in Kubwa than there were in their original home places, the Gbagi people seem to have lost valuable kith and kin communal relationship. Social interactions and relationships are highly superficial with most of their neighbours who are predominantly of different cultures and social status but are now cohabiting in the town.

This findings corroborate earlier research results by Ayanda (1988), Jackson and Sleigh (2000), and Olawepo (2008) who argued that resettlement often disrupts occupation of indigenous population. The occupational disruption of farmers in Kubwa resettlement town supports this observation and probably explains why most of the resettled people are migrating out of their new place Kubwa.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the findings of this research the following recommendations were made:

1. Basic educational institutions particularly primary and secondary schools should be established by government at Kubwa to avail the resettled persons with more opportunities to enhance their educational status.
2. In addition, skill acquisition centres should be provided by government to train the Gbagi people who already sold out their parcels of farmlands and are now jobless to start new business.
3. All future proposed development projects should be implemented timely to avoid sudden last minute rush. The sudden movement of the FCC to Abuja without adequate provision for residential accommodation of staff significantly affected the success of the Kubwa resentment project adversely; corporate organizations, individuals and organized private sector invaded the resettlement village and cajoled the resettled people into selling their farmlands. This eventually boomerang into massive disruption of occupations and high unemployment rates among the affected households.

## CONCLUSION

It can be argued that given the variables considered, the Gbagi people resettled in Kubwa are socio-economically worse off than they were in their original villages. The opportunities for basic education are lost, and there is high unemployment rate and dwindling house household incomes occasioned by dislocation from the dominant traditional farming occupation. Also, though the people appear to enjoy more social welfare facilities than ever before, they have significantly lost valuable social support networks through kith and kin social relationships during their stay at Kubwa as more and more foreign tribes invade the place meant to provide a rural community setting for resettled population. However, appropriate measures as recommended would enhance the status of the resettled people and ensure successful implementation of future resettlement projects.

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