

COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND ASEAN TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper will discuss cooperation between Indonesia and ASEAN to combat terrorism, although we cannot desperate Indonesia as ASEAN member, hence this section describes ASEAN and Indonesia as a whole. The Indonesian government's strategy as one of ASEAN member of implementing securitizing policy by increasing the cooperation between them in internal security particularly to fight against terrorism was potentially motivated by several contextual factors. Current paper builds upon Caballero-Anthony and Emmers' securitization theory by emphasizing the importance of political international and institutional motivations behind not only securitizing speech act, but also the related non-discursive action. It may be concluded that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11) changed ASEAN's framework of security cooperation. This event was a turning point when ASEAN began to achieve that there is a need to bring together differences in security assessment of its member states, particularly concerning traditional security issues. Instead of adopting some joint declarations and counter terrorism programs, ASEAN also has moved towards the development of a broader framework of cooperation in the security domain. Finally, incorporating Indonesia and other ASEAN countries has brought challenge to Indonesian strategy security and challenge to the capability of ASEAN as a regional cooperation.

Keywords: terrorism, ASEAN, Indonesia, security


INTRODUCTION

The 9/11 and was followed by the Bali bombing in October 2002 has marked Southeast Asia was becoming the hub of *global terrorist* activities. The Bush administration started to view the region as the 'second front' in its 'war on terror'. It feared South-East Asia with its weak states, history of political violence, high levels of poverty, and porous borders could become a safe haven or at least a region "of convenience" for al Qaeda (Abuza,2003:35; Tay,2003:97-98). Although terrorism is classified as a non-conventional threat, how to reply to terrorism is directed by conventional configurations of states. Referring to this condition, collaboration Indonesia and other countries in ASEAN to respond to security threats more dynamically.

This paper will discuss cooperation between Indonesia and ASEAN to combat terrorism, although we cannot desperate Indonesia as ASEAN member, hence this section describes ASEAN and Indonesia as a whole. The Indonesian government's strategy as one of ASEAN member of implementing securitizing policy by increasing the cooperation between them in internal security particularly to fight against terrorism was potentially motivated by several contextual factors.

This paper builds upon Caballero-Anthony and Emmers' securitization theory by emphasizing the importance of political international and institutional motivations behind not only securitizing speech act, but also the related non-discursive action.

Figure 1: Modified Securitization Framework



Motivation to Securitize

After the Cold War, ASEAN is by examining the change of the notion of security in the region which has shifted from a realist tradition of defining security in the military term to a broader understanding of security as a wide spectrum which also includes non-traditional security issues (Dosch, 2003). The end of the Cold War has also prompted a new discourse on the traditional view of security within ASEAN, with a new emphasis on incorporating economic, societal, and environmental aspects of security into its agenda. There are various non-traditional security issues that hold the agenda of regional security as follows: intra-state and ethnic conflicts; transnational crimes which comprise issues such as terrorism, maritime piracy, arms smuggling, people smuggling, and illicit drug trafficking; economic instability and poverty; transnational diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, SARS, and the Avian Flu); political transformations, in relations with the issue of human rights, democracy, and good governance; and environmental degradation and natural disaster.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11), terrorist threats from and within South-East Asia come into the global spotlight. Indeed, already in the early 1990s al Qaeda had strengthened its networks with national and local South-East Asian terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Abuza,2005:pp.38-39; Acharya & Acharya,2007: 76-78; Desker,2003:420-423; Gunaratna,2007:423-427; Jones, Smith, & Wedding,2003:444-450). All in all, over the last several years political Islam in South-East Asia has increasingly become radicalised and transnationalized (Abuza,2003:4).

Nevertheless, it is not the 9/11 *per se* that has changed ASEAN's framework of security cooperation. This event was a turning point when ASEAN began to achieve that there is a need to bring together differences in security assessment of its member states, particularly concerning traditional security issues. Instead of adopting some joint declarations and counter terrorism programs, ASEAN also has moved towards the development of a broader framework of cooperation in the security domain. Finally, incorporating Indonesia and other ASEAN countries has brought challenge to Indonesian strategy security and challenge to the capability of ASEAN as a regional cooperation.

Securitizing Speech Act

The analysis of how Indonesia-ASEAN has securitized terrorism, this section regards the Indonesian and ASEAN leaders and the ministers of the interior and security affairs as the main security actors (Emmers, 2003:423).

The attacks of 11 September 2001 shocked not only the USA, but also Southeast Asian countries. At same year, Foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda signed a United Nations convention on combating terrorism at the UN headquarters. With the signing of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Indonesia became the 45th country to accept it. He promised to share more intelligence information with other Southeast Asian nations, as stated in his statements below:

It is not merely because of the Indonesia had long been considering signing the anti-terrorism convention and it was not solely a response to the deadly Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. ...New York and Washington incidents, but much more than that. We have even been thinking of taking action in respect of other possible international crimes.... This is an expression of the Indonesian government joining the international effort to prevent terrorism.... The signing of the convention was necessary to strengthen Indonesia's armory of legal instruments.... As soon as the convention is ratified by the House of Representatives (DPR), it will become part of Indonesian law. But, of course, it will need further executor regulations in domestic law (Desi,2001).

Referring to this condition, within the framework of the convention, Jakarta would try to enhance intelligence coordination with fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other countries. With the signing the convention that's mean Indonesia is the second ASEAN country after the Philippines to have signed the convention. The convention necessitates the contracting states to closely monitor the collection or receipt of money by organizations in support of terrorist activities in another country. In addition, it command the contracting states to freeze and prevent access to such funds by groups supporting terrorist organizations, and also to prosecute or extradite persons found guilty of involvement in such activities for terrorist organizations.

In 2002, after the Bali bombing, Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri called for a global coalition to battle terrorism the day after an Indonesian court handed a death sentence to one of the Bali bombers, delivering the ASEAN lecture, Megawati pointed out that "the September 11 attacks on the United States, last October's Bali bombing, and the deadly car bombing in Jakarta on Tuesday have shown that regional plans of action to tackle terrorism and cross-border crimes like drug smuggling are inadequate....It became clear that no single country or group of countries could overcome this threat alone. In Indonesia's view, which is shared by the rest of the ASEAN members, it would take a global coalition involving all nations, all societies, religions and cultures to defeat this threat" (New Age International:2002).

Speech by Indonesian President Megawati, after the bomb attack on the JW Marriott Hotel killed 12 people and wounded 150 in 2003, she said "the bombing of a luxury hotel in Jakarta showed Southeast Asia's cooperation in the war on terror was inadequate....Regional plans of action to tackle such problems had long been established as part and parcel of ASEAN's functional cooperation, but suddenly these appeared to be inadequate in the face of the cataclysms like terror attacks in the United States, Bali and a few days ago in the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta.... In Indonesia's view, which is shared by the rest of ASEAN members, it will take a global coalition involving all nations, all societies, religions and cultures to defeat this threat". Moreover, she urged that Southeast Asian countries to push forward a security community to counter international terrorism amid moves to prevent militant strikes on ships in the vital Malacca Strait (The Jakarta Post,2003).

Thereafter, addressing diplomats from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a public lecture, Megawati said "no nation or group of countries could ever overcome the threat of international terrorism alone" (The Jakarta Post,2003).

An opening speech in 2004, Megawati maintained that "We in ASEAN have no reason to be complacent.... stressed the need to increase cooperation on security to address threats in a region struck by several deadly extremist militant attacks since the Sept. 11, 2001 strikes in the US.... We must also be at the forefront in the fight against the most inhuman of multinational crimes such as international terrorism and try to narrow differences on tackling militancy without diluting sovereignty." Although in reality, the security pact would address defense cooperation and international peacekeeping missions, but without a formal pact or alliance since some ASEAN members are unhappy with an initiative that is seen as violation on individual states. As she said "Contrary to the misgivings of many, we shall not form a military alliance nor conclude a defense pact, because that is not what an ASEAN Security Community is about..... The ASEAN members to be at the forefront in the fight against the most inhuman of multinational crimes, international terrorism" (Taipei Times,2004; Indonesia:ASEAN,2004).

Ong Keng Yong, He was the Secretary-General of the [Association of Southeast Asian Nations](#) (ASEAN) from 2003 to 2007, he pointed out the ASEAN's contribution to regional efforts in counterterrorism in a speech at the National Security Australia Conference in February 21, 2005.

The comprehensive framework was then developed and implemented in line with "Cebu Convention on Counterterrorism which was agreed by ten leaders of ASEAN countries (ASEAN Secretariat,2007). The declaration stated that the ASEAN states were:

Deeply concerned over the grave danger posed by terrorism to innocent lives, infrastructure and the environment, regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development; reiterating that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, and by whomsoever, *is a profound threat to international peace and security* and a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity for ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020. (ASEAN Secretariat 2007).

Audience Acceptance

Regarding the attack of 11 September 2001, Singapore strongly supported the USA in its declaration of war against terrorism from early on. At an assembly in the national stadium, before an audience of 15,000, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said that Singapore would join the USA in the GWOT, even though he would have to consider the regional and domestic situation. Furthermore, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia condemned the attacks. In addition, Indonesia's President Megawati was the first leader to visit the USA after the accident. She condemned the attacks and promised to support the GWOT. Generally, the ASEAN states condemned the 9/11 attacks and supported the GWOT.

In the meantime, while after 9/11 Washington's political pressure to strengthen national and regional counter-terrorism policies was a crucial external driving force for deepening Indonesian Government and ASEAN make a cooperation to fight terrorism, the transnational impact of the Bali bombing in October 2002 must be regarded as the main trigger (Jones & Smith,2006:196). Prior to the terror attacks on *the Island of the Gods* (Pulau Dewa), Indonesian Government denied the existence of any terrorist threats in the country (Dillon,2003:4). Terrorism is a fact threat. The deadly danger of terrorism to International community in South-East Asia, although, due to political interests of the regimes or other security actor, its dangers can be either exaggerated or minimized. In November 2001 ASEAN issued a common declaration to condemn terrorism and to work together in the combat terrorism (Chow,2005).

In the meantime, sensitivity to sovereignty issues makes some states reluctant to accept foreign presences in their territory for the sake counterterrorism. Such as Malaysia and Indonesia are fiercely protective against any outside interference in their waters, which they staged a protest against the U.S.-proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to secure Southeast Asian waters against piracy and terrorism threats. Even domestic extremist groups such as the MMI (the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia) have offered help to the Indonesian navy to drive out the U.S. fleet if it came

to the Malacca Strait (BBC News,2004). Malaysia has felt that a foreign military presence in its territorial waters would set it back in its “ideological battle against extremism and militancy” (Straits Times,2004). Kuala Lumpur fears that highly visible U.S. naval operations undertaken for the sake of suppressing terrorism would be exploited by militant groups to mobilize support for their cause and to discredit the government’s counterterrorism policy, which is expected to rely less on direct military action and more on winning hearts and minds (Business Times:2002).

Non-Discursive Action

In 1997, in a conference attended by the ministers of the interior with the *theme the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime issued*, terrorism is also mentioned. One of the ways to combat terrorism is the exchange of information and the coordination of policies. The declaration pointed out that ASEAN was convinced regional cooperation was necessary in order to counter transnational crime effectively, and the document details a number of measures to be taken to that end:

- a. Strengthening the obligation of member states to participate in regional crime fighting activities;
- b. Establishment of meetings of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime at least every two years, in order to coordinate the activities of the relevant organs (e.g. the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, or ASEANPOL);
- c. Agreements on mutual legal assistance, treaties, memoranda of understanding, and other such matters.
- d. Establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime (ACOT) to coordinate regional attempts to fight crime and to engage in the exchange of critical information, harmonization of policies and the coordination of operations;
- e. Establishment of an ad-hoc expert group, which, with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, would fulfill the following tasks in the years to come: to develop an ASEAN Action Plan on Transnational Crime; to develop plans for an institutional framework for ASEAN countries’ cooperation in this field; and to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of ACOT;
- f. A request for each member state to name representative and coordinators for cooperation;
- g. Networking between the relevant national institutions;
- h. Strengthening of member states’ efforts in the fight against transnational crime, with the ASEAN Secretary-General requested to integrate this field into his working program;
- i. The necessity of cooperation with other international institutions, such as the UN, and with intraregional organizations; and
- j. Strengthening of Secretariat resources, necessary to support the member states in their fight against transnational crime. (ASEAN Secretariat 1997).

The 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (ASEAN Secretariat 1999a) showed the threat of transnational crime as being connected to economic well-being in ASEAN countries and as having evolved as a consequence of globalization. It proposed measures to fight transnational crime which were explained in detail. Because of the increase in terrorism in Southeast Asia, after the attack of 11 September 2001, the USA declared the region the ‘second front’ in the GWOT. At the same time, to address the development in the global, regional and national security agenda, Megawati developed a more systematic policy and started to establish relationships with other countries within Southeast Asia Region to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia particularly in Indonesia, such as Indonesia participated with other ASEAN Leaders, at their 7th Summit on 5 November 2001 in Brunei Darussalam, adopted the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (ASEAN Secretariat 2001a). The terrorist attacks on the USA were condemned, and understood as an attack on the whole of humanity.

They viewed terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and "a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020". They expressed commitment to combat terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, other international laws and relevant UN resolutions. At the same time, and this was repeated over the following years, any connection between religion or race and terrorism was denied: “We reject any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race” (ASEAN Secretariat 2001a). In this,

ASEAN departs from the line followed by the USA, which is somewhat casual about delinking terrorism from Islam. In the declaration, ASEAN also committed itself to the Charter of the UN:

We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 and consider such acts as an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us;

We view acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which requires concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

We believe terrorism to be a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020. (ASEAN Secretariat 2001a).

They also underlined that "cooperative efforts in this regard should consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country". To fight terrorism, ASEAN as well as larger regional groupings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the APEC grouping, have undertaken a number of initiatives, including mechanisms to share information, intelligence, and best practices and to build law enforcement and investigation capabilities of the agencies of respective member countries.

Policy Motivation

In reaction to the 9/11 attacks, an important element in the counter terrorism is ASEAN pledged itself to effective policies and strategies to promote the well-being of its populations. The declaration of ASEAN regarded terrorism as a threat both to peace and stability in the region and to its economic development. It can be overcome by regional cooperation. In the declaration showed that the states were to test and check their national measures against terrorism and strengthen them. Moreover, any international conventions with reference to terrorism were to be signed and ratified, such as 'ASEAN mechanism on combating international terrorism' (ASEAN Secretariat 2001a). For this reason, ASEAN member states and with other regional institution should improve information exchange and cooperation between them. Furthermore, it may be necessary to set up regional programmers for the increase of capacities in the combat terrorism. Police cooperation and information exchange between the relevant agencies and also cooperation within ASEAN and between organs that dealt with counterterrorism were to be enhanced. ASEAN would support member states in their combat terrorism (by detecting, investigating, monitoring and reporting on terrorist acts). ASEAN's role at the international level in the fight against terrorism was to be strengthened, as was regional and international cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat 2001a)

Following that, the ASEAN Leaders reiterated their determination to carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. They resolved to intensify their efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region. Practical cooperative measures were to be pursued with the international community in fighting terrorism.

In the meantime, the 2002 Bali bombings occurred on 12 October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali has changed the political landscape in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region in a number of ways that have implications for the ASEAN-Indonesia relationship. International terrorism is now further confirmed as a significant issue for Southeast Asia as a whole, with operatives arrested in Muslim and non-Muslim states alike. This is now the most serious crisis confronting ASEAN, and risks creating further divisions in ASEAN because other members have accused Indonesia of failing to take the issue seriously.

CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11) changed ASEAN's framework of security cooperation. This event was a turning point when ASEAN began to achieve that there is a need to bring together differences in security assessment of its member states, particularly concerning traditional security issues. Instead of adopting some joint declarations and counter terrorism programs, ASEAN also has moved towards the development of a broader framework of cooperation in the security domain. Finally, incorporating Indonesia and other ASEAN countries has brought challenge to Indonesian strategy security and challenge to the capability of ASEAN as a regional cooperation.

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